























1.0 Introduction – background and scope of the report ..................................................................... 3 
1.1 Background and outline ............................................................................................................. 3 
1.2. Scope and objectives................................................................................................................. 3 
2.0 Unemployment and unemployment insurance systems ............................................................... 4 
2.1 What causes unemployment? ................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Purposes and benefits of an unemployment insurance system ................................................ 5 
2.3 Providers of unemployment systems ........................................................................................ 6 
3.0 Characteristics of unemployment insurance systems ................................................................... 9 
3.1 Public vs private unemployment insurance ............................................................................... 9 
3.2 Mandatory vs voluntary insurance .......................................................................................... 11 
3.3. Financing ................................................................................................................................. 11 
3.4. Organization and administration ............................................................................................ 12 
3.5. Target group ............................................................................................................................ 12 
3.6. Eligibility conditions ................................................................................................................ 12 
3.7. Generosity ............................................................................................................................... 13 
3.8. Main insurance vs supplementary insurance ......................................................................... 13 
4.0 International experiences ............................................................................................................ 14 
4.1 The Social Democratic or Universal regimes (Denmark) ......................................................... 14 
4.2 Continental, Corporatist regimes (Germany) .......................................................................... 17 
4.3 Liberal regimes (Great Britain) ................................................................................................. 18 
4.4 Southern European Regimes (Spain) ....................................................................................... 21 
5.0 Comparison and discussion .......................................................................................................... 23 








1.0 Introduction – background and scope of the report 
1.1 Background and outline 
This research report is a part of the cooperation project between the Tunisian General Labor 
Confederation (UGTT) and the LO/FTF Council, supported by the European Union and aiming at 
strengthening the UGTT's capacities to actively participate in the social dialogue in Tunisia. As part 
of the cooperation project, the UGTT wish to gain more knowledge and experiences about the 
concept of job loss and not least different ways of alleviate the economic and social consequences 
of unemployment. This is related to the third theme tackled in the social contract ‘Industrial 
relations and decent work’, which stipulates the creation of an unemployment insurance fund for 
workers who, for different reasons, lose their jobs.  
In Tunisia the concept of an unemployment insurance fund is new. Hence, the UGTT wishes to 
benefit from some expertise on the concept of unemployment insurance funds, in collaboration 
with the LO/FTF Council, in order to contribute to the process of drafting a bill setting up the 
financial and legal framework for an unemployment insurance fund. In order to gain more 
knowledge on how to establish a possible unemployment insurance system LO/FTF Council has 
asked Centre for Labour Market Research (CARMA) to conduct an international, comparative 
study of different, existing unemployment insurance systems. The results are presented in this 
research report. 
CARMA is a research group based at Aalborg University, Denmark and has more than 30 years of 
experience in international, comparative studies of labour market issues. The study presented in 
this research report is conducted jointly by Postdoctoral researcher, Ph.D. Laust Høgedahl and 
Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Stine Rasmussen from CARMA. Both researchers have studied and 
published internationally on various aspects of unemployment insurance funds.     
1.2. Scope and objectives  
The scope of the study is to investigate the following issues related to unemployment insurance 
systems: 
 Identify the international experiences in the field 
 Define the legal framework for setting up such a fund/system 
 Indicating financing arrangements 
 Set up the optional structures and mechanisms 
In order to cover the issues mentioned above, the investigation will draw on a comparative 
research design covering various models of unemployment insurance systems situated in different 
countries. The aim is to present different types of unemployment insurance systems including pros 
and cons of each system. 
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The method and data used is based on a qualitative desk-research of existing literature in the field.  
This includes publications from relevant authorities e.g. EU and the Danish Government’s 
unemployment benefits commission [Dagpengekommissionen].     
The report consists of six main sections: In the following section 2.0 Unemployment and 
unemployment insurance systems we briefly describe different types of unemployment and the 
social and economic consequences that are connected to job loss. In this section we also outline 
the purposes and benefits of an unemployment insurance systems and why different countries 
have developed rather different systems over the course of time. In section 3.0 Characteristics of 
unemployment insurance systems we outline the key features of any unemployment insurance 
system, e.g. if the system is private or public based, if the system is based on an optional 
membership or if the system is compulsory, taxed based system vs systems based on membership 
fees etc. These key features are important to bear in mind when sketching up a new 
unemployment system in Tunisia and we will also use these features when describing and 
analyzing different unemployment insurance systems. In section 4.0 National experiences with 
unemployment insurance systems we present our analytic findings from different types of 
unemployment insurance systems. Here we focus on four different unemployment regimes. In 
section 5.0 Comparison and Discussion we compare the different unemployment insurance 
regimes and discuss the pros and cons of each system in an international and comparative 
perspective serving as an inspiration for the UGTT. In the last in final section 6.0 Conclusion and 
perspectives we present different pathways to creating a new unemployment insurance system in 
Tunisia.   
2.0 Unemployment and unemployment insurance systems  
2.1 What causes unemployment? 
Unemployment is a product of any labour market with a supply and demand of labour and 
unemployment occur when the supply of labour exceed the demand. However, there are many 
different theoretical reasons for the rise and fall in unemployment for any given labour market. 
Hence, we also find different types of unemployment. Basically, we can list three main forms of 
unemployment:  
 Frictional  
Frictional unemployment, also called search unemployment, occurs when workers lose their 





 Structural  
Structural unemployment occurs when certain industries decline because of long term changes in 
market conditions. This type of unemployment arises through a change in demand which switches 
production from one kind of work to another; it differs from frictional unemployment in that it 
occurs through permanent or long-term changes in the structure of the economy.  
 Cyclical  
This type of unemployment arises from the business cycle. Such unemployment occurs due to 
deficiency of demand or purchasing power and is also called demand-deficient unemployment. 
Since this type of unemployment is due to downturn in economic activity, it can, therefore, be 
expected to occur and disappear at fairly regular intervals. The global financial and economic crisis 
in 2008 had a strong effect on the cyclical unemployment rate in many countries. 
Apart for the three main types of unemployment listed above many others can be identified such 
as seasonal unemployment due to weather or lack of raw material or regional unemployment 
which is linked to a specific area. The same goes for youth unemployment were young workers for 
different reasons have a higher unemployment rate compared to older workers. In Tunisia there 
are rather significant differences in unemployment levels between the rural and urban areas and 
between young and older workers (The World Bank, 2017).  
2.2 Purposes and benefits of an unemployment insurance system 
There are many different consequences of unemployment for the individual worker, close family, 
community and the overall economy. Hence, a number for different purposes of an 
unemployment insurance system can be identified: 
 Creates security  
First of all an unemployment insurance system is designed in order to give the individual worker 
economic security in case of unemployment and thus make sure that the worker can uphold a 
decent living standard in times without earnings from a job. Furthermore, research indicates that 
unemployment is linked to stress, ill-health and other physical, psychological and social issues 
(Mathers & Schofield, 1998). Hence, there is a wide range of (positive) purposes and benefits of an 
unemployment system at the individual and family level. The sense of security is widely based on 
the compensation level, the length of the benefits etc.  
However, a high level of security can also have positive effect at a macro level. The Danish labour 
market model is widely known for Flexicurity where a rather generous unemployment benefit is 
one of the three corner stones in the model besides high flexibility for employers in terms of hiring 
and firing and active labour market policies (Madsen, 2003). The high sense of security provided 
by the unemployment insurance system means that workers in Denmark do not fear 
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unemployment even though the probability for unemployment is rather high compared to other 
countries. The Danish Flexicurity model and the unemployment insurance system, which is a 
fundamental part of the model, have proven to give a strong international competitiveness for 
Danish employers apart from providing security for the individual worker.     
 Better match between supply and demand 
An unemployment insurance system can also help a better match between supply and demand 
between companies and unemployed workers. When workers receive unemployment benefits 
they are not forced to take work that they are over-qualified for. If workers do not have 
unemployment benefits they are more inclined to find any kind of job quickly after becoming 
unemployed in order to sustain an income. They then immediately start looking for a new job 
more suited for their qualifications. This can lead to a large job-turnover which is costly for 
companies.   
 Securing consumer spending 
The economic effect or output of unemployment has also been widely studied especially in 
combination with unemployment insurance systems (Hansen & İmrohoroğlu, 1992). An 
unemployment insurance system is of course an expenditure and many economists have 
calculated the costs of an unemployment insurance system in a macroeconomic perspective. 
However, as Orszag (2001) shows, unemployment benefits can work as an economic stimulus for 
the overall economy. By partially compensating for lost income, unemployment benefits lessens 
the reduction in spending that unemployment can cause (see also Gruber, 1994). So even though 
a unemployment insurance system immediately can be seen as an expenditure, the fact that 
unemployed workers do not lose their entire income do have a positive effect on the consumer 
spending and therefore the overall national economy.  
2.3 Providers of unemployment systems   
Different countries have different traditions in terms of who are the main providers of 
unemployment insurance benefits. For most countries the developments of unemployment 
insurance systems occur in the wake of the first wave of industrialisation. The move from an 
agriculture based self-sufficient society to the rise of capitalism and production created a working 
class and the concept of unemployment as a consequence. Different countries took different 
paths in order to find solutions to the problems related to unemployment.   
Basically, the unemployment insurance system can be provided by either the state, the private 




The different systems in different countries have a long history and are closely related to the 
development of other welfare arrangements in each country.  Esping-Andersen (1990) was one of 
the first to identity different welfare state regimes by focusing on the notions of 
decommodification, stratification and public private mix. Decommodification refers to ‘the degree 
to which distribution is not linked to market mechanism’, while stratification implies the degree to 
which ‘one’s status as a citizen will compete with, or even replace, one’s class position ‘. Also 
Esping-Andersen (1990) identified public-private mix (or the state-market nexus) in a narrower 
sense, which is based on a distinction between public and private provision of social security 
benefits. Later he included the civil society in his analysis as included in Figure 1. In many countries 
the unemployment insurance system is a mixture of both public and private arrangements.  
 Ozkan (2014) uses the welfare state regime typology to identify different unemployment 
insurance system regimes as illustrated in table 1. 
Table 1 – Features of unemployment insurance schemes in unemployment welfare regimes  
Regime Coverage Level of coverage  
Liberal Incomplete Weak 
Southern Europe Incomplete or Variable Weak or unequal  
Continental  Variable Unequal 
Social Democratic Comprehensive High 
 Sourse: Ozkan (2014) + own additions 
In the liberal welfare state regimes such as the UK, US, New Zealand and Australia the coverage of 
the unemployment insurance schemes are incomplete. Here the unemployment systems do not 
provide coverage for most of the unemployed, and they offer very limited financial assistance 
compared to other regimes. The underlying logic in the liberal welfare state regimes is to 
encourage the unemployed to take responsibility for themselves in order to avoid becoming 
State 
Private market Civil society 
Figure 1 - Different provider of UI systems 
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dependent on social assistance. Here the unemployment benefits are often based on means 
testing.  
Southern Europe regimes (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) only cover a small proportion of the 
unemployment population due to the strict eligibility criterion based on employment and 
contributions records. The benefit duration is normally short and based on years of employment, 
hence, both the coverage and the level of coverage are variable and unequal at the same time. 
The Southern Europe system tends to create an insider/outsider system were those workers with 
a long seniority often have better security in comparison to those who do not have a permanent 
contract and long seniority. In the Southern European countries the civil society plays a much 
more prominent role in terms of delivering social services.    
In the continental countries such as Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, the coverage is, 
for the most part, better compared to the Southern European countries. However, the 
insider/outsider effect is also present here which means a variable coverage and unequal level of 
coverage for the individual worker.  
Finally, the Social Democratic countries, or Nordic countries, tent to have more comprehensive 
coverage and also a higher level of coverage.  
In all it is important to stress that an unemployment system can have different purposes and that 
the providers of the systems can differ between the state, the private market and the civil society. 
We also find that different countries have different systems, which are closely related to the 
historic development for different welfare state regimes. We will return to the different regimes 




3.0 Characteristics of unemployment insurance systems  
Unemployment insurance systems can be established in various ways and in this section we briefly 
describe a number of characteristics or more profound principles for unemployment insurance 
systems that has to be taken into account when a choice between different insurance systems is 
made. These will also serve as a larger framework for understanding the national experiences with 
unemployment insurance systems in the next section.  
We briefly outline the following characteristics:   
 Public vs private unemployment insurance  
 Compulsory vs voluntary unemployment insurance  
 Financing of the unemployment insurance scheme  
 Organization and administration of the unemployment insurance scheme  
 Target group  
 Eligibility criteria   
 Generosity   
 Main insurance vs supplementary insurance  
  
3.1 Public vs private unemployment insurance   
As already touched upon in section 2.3, unemployment insurance can either be a public or a 
private matter, because the insurance can either be provided by the state or by non-public players 
(private providers or civil society organizations) or by a mixture of both. Denmark is such an 
example, where trade union affiliated unemployment insurance funds (non-public 
organizations) administer the unemployment insurance but the state subsidizes the scheme and 
controls the unemployment funds. This is the so-called Ghent-system that we elaborate on in 
section 4.   
The choice between public vs private unemployment insurance is basically a question about how 
job loss and unemployment are perceived by policy makers. For instance, in Denmark 
the unemployment insurance emerged back in the 19th century as a private scheme set up by the 
trade unions in order to give economic support to union members that became unemployed, but 
early on the state became involved in the scheme. The political rationale behind this was that job 
loss and unemployment was perceived to be a societal matter rather than a purely individual 
matter. Therefore, it was believed that the state ought to intervene and should be involved in the 
unemployment insurance in order to cushion the negative effects of unemployment (Rasmussen 
2016).   
Historically, unemployment insurance schemes emerged in a number of countries as private 
arrangements, but today most countries with unemployment insurance have some sort of state 
involvement, either in the sense that the unemployment insurance 
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is a mandatory public arrangement or in the sense that the state subsidizes the scheme in some 
way or another. Private insurance schemes are based upon a so called actuarial principle. This 
means that the premium (the amount of money paid by the insured for the insurance) is 
dependent upon a weighted calculation on a persons’ risk of unemployment and size of income 
loss. However, for a number of reasons it is difficult to determine an actuarial premium for 
unemployment, wherefore purely private arrangements are perceived to be less sustainable and 
this explains why state involvement in the insurance has become the norm (Unemployment 
Insurance Commission 2015a: 5-7). The problems with calculation of an actuarial premium in a 
private scheme are:     
 First of all, insurance companies need full information about the insured person’s risk of 
unemployment, but don’t always have it and this fact limits their possibilities for 
calculating the premium. This is due to the concept of moral hazard where persons, who 
have taken an insurance against unemployment can affect own risk of unemployment as 
well as the length of the unemployment spell. The insurance companies are not able to 
control this behavior and do not have information about this behavior. For instance, it is 
difficult for the insurance company to know whether a longer unemployment spell has to 
do with the individual’s job search behavior or with external factors such as a recession 
where no jobs are available (Unemployment Insurance Commission 2015a:5-6.)   
 
 Secondly, when calculating the premium, insurance companies need to be able to 
distinguish between persons with different risks of unemployment. If this is not possible, 
all insured workers will pay the same premium. When the premium does not reflect the 
individual risk of unemployment, then workers with a low risk of unemployment will avoid 
the insurance because they perceive the premium to be too high. And when workers with 
low risk of unemployment opt out the insurance, then workers with higher unemployment 
risks remain. However, this will lead to a higher premium because the premium is based 
upon unemployment risks and eventually this can lead to the fall of the insurance, simply 
because the insured workers are not able to pay the premium. This problem is 
called adverse selection (Bjørn and Høy 2014:8; Unemployment Insurance Commission 
2015a:6).  
Furthermore, purely private insurance arrangements become economically vulnerable in 
economic downturns, because their expenses increase when more insured persons become 
unemployed. Often the premium follows the state of the market with a lower premium in 
economic upturns and a higher premium in economic downturns but a high premium at 




3.2 Compulsory vs voluntary insurance  
Another fundamental principle is about the insurance being compulsory or voluntary. When 
insurance is voluntary, the individual worker actively decides whether or not to join the insurance 
scheme and benefit receipt is dependent on that choice, whereas in a compulsory unemployment 
insurance scheme, the working population is obligated to join the scheme. Today, most countries 
with unemployment insurance arrangements have compulsory schemes, probably as a solution to 
some of the problems with informational asymmetry, adverse selection and moral 
hazard mentioned in section 3.1. (Bjørn and Høy 2014: 8; Holmlund 2015:4). For instance, in a 
compulsory system the problem with adverse selection cannot occur, because the insurance 
cannot be deselected. Therefore, the share of persons enrolled in the unemployment insurance is 
higher than in a voluntarily system.   
Today, compulsory systems are found in countries like Norway, Germany, Austria, Canada, the UK, 
France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Belgium while only Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
Iceland (the Ghent countries) have voluntary systems. In these systems the individual has to 
actively join an unemployment insurance fund in order to be able to receive unemployment 
insurance benefits. Despite the risk of a low coverage in a voluntarily system, the Ghent systems 
do have quite high support from the employed population. In Denmark and Finland around 75 % 
of the employed populations are members of an unemployment insurance fund and in Sweden 
the share is around 65 % (Høgedahl and Kongshøj 2017:7).   
3.3. Financing   
Several actors or combinations of actors can finance an unemployment insurance scheme – the 
state (through tax payments), the employed population (either through member contributions or 
through labour market contributions) and/or the employers (through employers’ contributions). 
Furthermore, state financing can take place in different ways: The state can give a subsidy to the 
insurance, which can be fixed or variable. The state can also choose only to cover deficits (Esser at 
al 2013:17-18). As we return to in section 4, when we describe national experiences with different 
unemployment insurance schemes, there are great variations between the countries both in terms 
of the actors who are involved in the financing as well as how much they contribute. For example, 
Denmark is an example of a country with a combination of state and membership contribution 
and where the state finances the majority of the insurance. On the contrary, the other countries 
run different combinations of employer and employee financing. We will return to these 




3.4. Organization and administration   
The responsibility of running the administration of the unemployment insurance scheme at the 
operational level is also an important matter. In the compulsory systems where the state is 
involved, normally government agencies are responsible for administration and disbursement of 
the scheme, but in systems where non-public players are involved, they too can be responsible for 
the administration. For instance, in Denmark unemployment insurance funds (member 
organizations) are responsible for administration and disbursement of the scheme.   
 
3.5. Target group  
Another important issue is who can get access to an unemployment insurance scheme? Should all 
groups on the labour market or only certain groups have access to the scheme? In a number of 
countries all persons in paid employment (both employees and self-employed) have the possibility 
to access the scheme, but in others only employees are allowed into the scheme. An issue is also 
whether persons in training positions, atypical employment forms and graduates are allowed into 
the scheme or not.     
 
 3.6. Eligibility conditions  
Besides broader or smaller target groups, the unemployment insurance schemes also have certain 
requirements in order to become eligible for the benefits in the first place and secondly different 
criteria to fulfill during unemployment in order to stay eligible:   
Entrance criteria. Normally, eligibility for unemployment benefits is defined by past employment 
or past earnings during a certain period of time and – if the insurance is voluntary – membership 
for a certain period of time. Normally, it is also required that job loss is not self-induced. Self-
induced job loss can be if a job is terminated for no good reason. In case of self-induced job loss, a 
quarantine period normally sets in, which is a sanction imposed upon the unemployed, where the 
unemployed cannot receive the benefit for a certain period of time. Furthermore, in some 
countries there is a short waiting period from the job loss sets in until benefits are possible 
(normally a few days up to a week). A waiting period can be a mechanism to keep expenses to the 
insurance down.  
Criteria to stay in the unemployment insurance. Normally, there also are a number of 
requirements for the unemployed persons in order to stay in the scheme and continue to receive 
the benefit. It is standard to demand that the unemployed must be available for work, actively 
seeking job and are registered at a local jobcenter or labour agency. Furthermore, countries can 
have different requirements for the unemployed person to full-fill, which are part of the active 
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labour market policy in each country. For instance, in Denmark unemployed persons are required 
to go to several interviews either at the local job center or at the unemployment insurance fund 
during their unemployment period. They are also obligated to participate in different types of 
activation programs such as wage subsidy or internship programs in companies and so on.  
 
3.7. Generosity   
Another factor is the generosity of the unemployment insurance, which is often measured by two 
items - the benefit level and the duration of the benefits.   
Benefit level. Since unemployment insurance is understood as a temporary economic aid that can 
be given in case of unemployment, the principle is that the benefit level should reflect a certain 
fraction of previous earnings. Normally there is a cap stipulation on how high the benefit level can 
be and in some cases also a floor for the minimum benefit level.  
Duration of the benefit. Duration of the benefit also varies a lot between countries. In most 
countries the benefit duration is fixed, but it is possible to have a more fluent system where the 
benefit duration is dependent on the business cycle. Here, the duration of the benefit is longer in 
periods of recessions and shorter in economic upturns. Canada, the US and Chile have such 
unemployment insurance systems. In recent years such a system has been recommended in 
Denmark by certain commissions and councils, but has not yet been realized.  
The benefit level and the duration of the benefit may be dependent upon each other, where the 
benefit level is higher in the beginning of the unemployment period and declines concurrently 
with longer spells of unemployment. Benefit levels and benefit duration can also be dependent 
upon characteristics of the workers, for instance age and employment history. This can lead to 
some groups being favored in the system compared to others, but the argument can be that 
certain groups have a more insecure labour market attachment or are more challenged on the 
labour market which can legitimate a certain preferential treatment.  
 
 3.8. Main insurance vs supplementary insurance  
Another important factor is whether it should be possible to take out an additional insurance as a 
supplement to the main unemployment insurance or whether only one main insurance should 
exist. In a number of countries it is possible to take out a supplementary insurance next to the 
main insurance. This phenomenon can arise if the benefit level in the main insurance is perceived 
to be too low (for some groups at least). In this case it is possible to buy an additional insurance 




4.0 International experiences 
In this section we focus on analyzing four different regimes in terms of unemployment insurance: 
The Social Democratic, Continental, Liberal and Southern European regimes. Each section begins 
with a short presentation of the key features of each regime and we then describe four national 
systems; Denmark, Germany, England and Spain as cases. Here we focus on 1) Legal framework 2) 
Organization and financing 3) Content of the insurance and 4) Other benefits for each of the four 
countries. 
 
 4.1 The Social Democratic or Universal regimes (Denmark)  
In Nordic countries; Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland the unemployment insurance system 
is based on voluntary membership of unemployment insurance funds that are controlled by the 
labour movement and subsidized by the state as briefly described above. This system is also called 
‘the Ghent-system’ since it was first developed in the Belgium city of Ghent in the early 1900ies. 
The Ghent system of unemployment in the Nordic, Social Democratic regimes has been linked to a 
high union density. In an international comparison the Nordic countries have the highest union 
densities in the world at around 70 – 80 pct. (Høgedahl & Kongshøj, 2017). Norway is the only 
Nordic country not operating a Ghent system but a compulsory unemployment system and here 
the union density is considerably lower at around 55 pct. (Høgedahl 2014). It is important to stress 
that workers are not obligated to join a trade union in order to become member of an 
unemployment insurance fund in the Nordic Ghent countries. However, many workers do chose to 
be double members of both an unemployment insurance fund and a trade union at the same time. 
The membership density of unemployment insurance funds is around 80 pct. in Denmark. There 
are three main reasons for workers not joining an unemployment insurance fund. Some workers, 
especially public sector civil servants, have a high degree of employment protection and therefore 
calculate that the chances of unemployment are low. Other workers with a very high income do 
not find the compensation level of the benefits attractive while workers with high degree of 
unemployment often combined with sickness or other physical, psychological or social issues are 
more inclined to receive social benefits and not unemployment benefits.     
In this section we will focus on Denmark as a case of the Social Democratic regime, however, it is 
important underline that even though the Nordic countries are rather similar compared to other 
countries there are still differences in terms of coverage, durability etc. 
Legal framework 
The legal framework dictating the rules regarding unemployment insurance benefits and 
unemployment insurance funds are found in the Act of Standard Regulation for Recognized 
Unemployment Insurance Funds [Bekendtgørelse om standardvedtægt for anerkendte a-kasser] 
which field of responsibility is based at The Ministry of Employment.  
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Organization and financing 
There are 25 different unemployment insurance funds in Denmark. Some are linked to a specific 
trade union, others are linked to more than one trade union and a few funds operate completely 
independent with no connection to the labour movement. The unemployment insurance funds in 
Denmark are private associations of employees and/or self-employed persons organized for the 
sole purpose of ensuring economic support in the event of unemployment. In order to receive 
unemployment benefits Danish workers needs to be member of a fund and all types of workers 
are allowed into the unemployment insurance scheme, that is both employees, self-employed and 
persons employed in different contracts (part-time, fixed-term and so on). The membership fee is 
around 50-55 Euros pr. month which covers a fixed fee to the state (34 Euros) and administration 
expenditures for the fund, which the funds are free to determine. The price for running the 
unemployment insurance system in Denmark is greater than the fees payed by members 
themselves. Hence, the Danish state subsidizes a large part of the system and the subsidy varies 
from fund to fund (around 50 to 75 pct. of total expenditures) depending on level of 
unemployment in each fund. This means that the state has more expenses in times with higher 
unemployment levels and fewer expenses in timers with lower unemployment levels. In the latest 
economic boom in the beginning and middle of the 2000s, the unemployment insurance was self-
financed in the sense that the contribution fees from the members exceeded the expenses to the 
insurance (Unemployment Insurance Commission 2015d:2,6).  
Membership is voluntary which means that workers actively have to join a fund in order to get 
access to unemployment benefits. The unemployment Insurance Funds are supervised by the 
Danish Agency for Labour Market And Recruitment (STAR) which is an government agency 
operating under the Ministry of Employment.   
Content of the insurance 
In a comparative perspective the Danish unemployment insurance system has been known as a 
quite generous system both in terms of benefit levels and benefit duration. However, since the 
middle of the 1990ies the Danish system has undergone significant changes with a gradually 
reduction in the generosity level. For instance, a reform in 2010 halved the benefit duration from 4 
to 2 years and introduced stricter eligibility criteria and again in 2015 the system was subject to a 
larger reform (The Unemployment Benefit Reform) bringing rather comprehensive changes to the 
system in terms of (again) entailing stricter eligibility and shorter benefit duration. The reform also 
introduced new principles for benefit calculations were incentives for talking on shorter jobs while 
being unemployed was enhanced.   
Under current rules, an unemployed worker can receive unemployment benefits if he or she has 
been a member of an unemployment insurance fund for at least 1 year and has reported at least 
DKK 223.428 (EUR 30,033) as a fulltime insured member or DKK 148.956 (EUR 20,022) as a part 
time insured member as income (2017) to the income registry in the past 3 years. Benefits can be 
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received for a maximum of 2 years within a period of 3 years. Registration at a jobcenter, being 
available for work and actively seeking work are also requirements in order to receive the benefit.  
As a rule, the rate of unemployment benefit paid out is calculated on the basis of the 12 months 
with the highest income in the past 24 months.  It is possible to receive up to 90 per cent of the 
average salary income although most workers will have a higher income. This means that many 
have a compensation rate around 50-60 pct. However, it is not possible to receive more than the 
highest unemployment benefit rate, which in 2017 was DKK 18.403 (EUR 2,473) a month as a 
fulltime insured member and 12.269 (EUR 1,649) a month as a part time insured member. 
There are special rules regarding graduates who a able to become members of an unemployment 
insurance fund even if they do not have an employment record, on the condition that they join the 
fund immediately after graduation. Unemployed graduates receive a reduced unemployment 
benefit at a rate of 71.5 pct. of the normal level. 
Supplementary insurance 
In recent years and parallel with the reductions in the unemployment insurance system, which 
subsequently have made the Danish unemployment insurance benefits less attractive, private 
supplementary wage insurances have gain more popularity in Denmark. These wage insurances 
are supplied by private insurance companies and are provided as a supplement to the 
unemployment insurance systems. Normally these supplementary insurances top the 
unemployment insurance and give unemployed an extra amount of money on top of the amount 
given by the ordinary system. In 2016 around 200.000 supplementary wage insurances existed 
(www.forsikringogpension).       
Other benefits 
If a person has chosen not to be insured in an unemployment insurance fund, or if the person is 
not qualified for unemployment insurance or have used up the benefit right in the unemployment 
insurance system, social assistance [kontanthjælp] is an option. Social assistance is given to 
persons who are temporarily not able to provide for themselves and depends upon age, children 
and partners’ status and income. The eligibility criteria have also been tightened over time and for 
a significant share of those persons who have used the right to unemployment insurance, social 
assistance is not an option. 
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4.2 Continental, Corporatist regimes (Germany)1 
In continental countries (Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands as examples) the basic 
principle for social security and welfare benefits (unemployment benefits, pension, sick benefits 
and nursing care) is that it is compulsory and is realized through contributions from the labour 
market (employers and employees) in corporation with the state. Therefore joint responsibility 
between the state, employers and employees is emphasized in these countries. The benefits are 
typically dependent upon labour market attachment, wherefore these countries are more 
‘employment-centered’ compared to the Scandinavian welfare regime. In these countries, 
unemployment insurance is compulsory and mainly financed by contributions from employers and 
employees. In the following we briefly outline the German unemployment insurance system as an 
example of a continental unemployment insurance regime.  
Legal framework 
The German statutory unemployment insurance system is called Arbeitslosensversicherung or 
Unemployment I and is legally defined in Book III in the German Social Code from 1997 
[Sozialgesetsbuch], which is a comprehensive collection of legislation concerning the promotion of 
employment, vocational training and employment services. Here, the set of rules for the 
unemployment insurance is stated, for instance in terms of who are obligated to contribute to the 
scheme, eligibility criteria, benefit levels and so on. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs have the German unemployment insurance as field of responsibility.  
Organization and financing 
An employee is automatically enrolled in the unemployment insurance scheme once a person is 
employed and the employer is responsible for the enrollment. Trainees are also included, but not 
freelancers/self-employed. However, since 2006 self-employed have had the opportunity to 
contribute voluntarily to the scheme under certain conditions. Disbursement and administration 
of the scheme is handled by federal labour offices [German Bundesagentur für Arbeit]. The 
monthly contribution rate is 3 pct. of the income and is divided equally between the employee 
and the employer (1.5 pct. each). If the expenses to the unemployment insurance scheme 
decrease, then the contribution will decrease as well. The state gives a subsidy to run the labour 
offices.   
Content of the insurance 
The benefit level is 60 pct. of prior income (net income) for unemployed without children and 67 
pct. for unemployed with children. However, there is a monthly maximum limit of 6500 Euros in 
West Germany and 5800 Euros in East Germany. In order to be eligible for unemployment 
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insurance benefits in Germany 12 months of prior employment (and therefore also 12 months of 
contribution to the scheme) within 2 years is required. Also, registration as unemployed at the 
labour office is required. Unemployment is defined as no work or work less than 15 hours per 
week. If job loss is not self-induced, no waiting period exist and unemployment benefit can be 
received from the first day of unemployment. In case of self-induced job loss or not acceptance of 
job offers, a quarantine period of 12 weeks sets in. The benefit duration is dependent upon prior 
employment and contribution to the scheme. 12 months of employment within 2 years gives 
access to 6 months of benefits. The maximum duration of benefits is 1 year for persons below the 
age of 50, while special rules apply to persons over 50, where the benefit duration can be up to 2 
years. Therefore the German system favor older groups at the labour market as well as persons 
with a longer and more stable employment history.  
Other benefits 
If a person is not eligible for unemployment insurance in Germany, a basic job seeker allowance is 
possible (called Unemployment Benefits II). This allowance is a type of social assistance given to 
persons who are not able to ensure an adequate subsistence from their income or assets. This 
allowance is not restricted to persons outside employment, but persons in employment can also 
receive it benefit as a supplement to the unemployment insurance if the coverage from the 
insurance is not sufficient to make a decent living. This could be the case if someone works short 
hours at a low wage. The benefits are paid from the local job center and normally granted for 12 
months at a time. Job availability is required (can work at least three days a week).  
 
4.3 Liberal regimes (Great Britain)2 
Liberal regimes (countries like the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) are based upon the 
idea that welfare is created by private initiatives with modest state interference and the state only 
provides support for the groups most in need.  Welfare is financed through taxes but taxes are in 
general low because the welfare is quite limited. Furthermore, insurance-based schemes are 
dominant because of the understanding that the individuals must take responsibility for 
themselves. Therefore, in the case of unemployment liberal countries offer quite limited financial 
assistance and the coverage of unemployment benefits is rather low in a comparative perspective. 
In this section we briefly describe the unemployment insurance system in the United Kingdom 
(UK) as an example of a liberal unemployment insurance regime.  
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 This section is primarily based on information from Bjørn and Høy 2014, Unemployment Insurance Commission 
2015a, Unemployment Insurance Commission 2015d and these websites: https://www.gov.uk/jobseekers-allowance 
and https://www.missoc.org/. We use the term UK; however, some details are based on the English system and might 




In the UK unemployment insurance is mandatory and named contribution-based Jobseekers 
Allowance (JSA). It is legally defined in the Jobseekers Act from 1995. There also exists another 
type of Jobseekers Allowance called Income-based Jobseekers Allowance, which is a type of social 
assistance (see last section). The Jobseekers Act is a piece of legislation concerning both forms of 
Jobseekers Allowance and has stipulations on who can claim the allowance, eligibility criteria, 
benefit levels, job seeking behavior, sanctions and so on.  
Organization and financing 
Contribution-based Jobseekers Allowance is compulsory for all employed persons. Self-employed 
are normally not allowed into the scheme. The insurance is financed through employer and 
employee contributions. The contributions are paid to the National Insurance which is a tax 
system for employees and employers for funding state benefits (not only Jobseekers Allowance 
but also other types of benefits). Employees pay so called Class 1 contributions which also 
determine which benefits they are eligible for (only persons with class 1 contributions can become 
eligible for contribution-based JSA). Employee contributions are deducted from gross wages by 
employers and employers then add their contribution and remit the entire amount to the 
authorities along with other taxes. Employee contributions are calculated as certain percentages 
of certain parts of the salary during the different tax years. For instance, in the tax year 2018-2019 
12 pct. of the weekly income between £162 (182 EUR) and £892 (1000 EUR) was deducted and 2 
pct. of the salary over £892. For income below £162 no contribution is made. Employers 
contribute with approximately same amount.3 The state gives a small subsidy to the scheme. 
Administration of the scheme is made by government agencies called Jobcentre Plus, who operate 
under the Department of Work and Pensions. 
Content of the insurance 
Contribution-based JSA is a flat-rate benefit, but the benefit level is dependent upon the 
claimants’ age at the time of the claim. For persons aged 18-24 the weekly level is £57.90 
(approximately 65 Euro) and for persons aged 25 and older the weekly level is £73.10 pounds 
(approximately 82 Euro). In a comparative perspective, this level is quite low. A study by Bjørn and 
Høy have calculated that after 2 months of unemployment, the compensation rate in UK is around 
30 % of prior income (Bjørn and Høy 2014:26). The benefit level remains the same during the 
entire unemployment spell. The maximum duration for receiving contribution-based JSA is 182 
days (26 weeks) which make the benefit duration in the UK quite short in a comparative 
perspective (Høy and Bjørn 2014:20). In order to be eligible for contribution-based JSA claimants 
must have paid the contributions to the National Insurance for at least 26 weeks in one of two 
previous tax years and minimum 50 times in the last two years together. This means that persons 





with low income who do not earn enough to pay the contributions in the first place have 
difficulties getting access to the benefits.  
Besides having paid the necessary contributions, the claimant must also be involuntarily 
unemployed, not engaged in work for more than 16 hours per week, capable and available for 
work, actively seeking work and not enrolled in full-time education. The claimant must also fill out 
a Jobseekers Agreement which is an agreement about how the job search is handled during the 
unemployment period and take part in New Jobseekers Interview. If these requirements are not 
met, a quarantine period of 26 weeks sets in. There is also a seven day waiting period in order to 
receive the benefit.   
Other benefits 
Claimants who don’t qualify for contribution-based Jobseekers Allowance (for instance because 
they haven’t paid enough contributions due to low income or a more volatile connection to the 
labour market, because they are self-employed or because they have recently left the educational 
system) can get access to income based Jobseekers Allowance instead, which is a means tested 
social assistance financed through the taxes. Around 75 pct. of all unemployed receive this type of 
benefit (Unemployment Insurance Commission 2015a:57), which also reveals the more limited 
character of those receiving contribution-based JSA. The benefit level is pretty much the same as 
the contribution-based Jobseeker Allowance and the conditions are also alike. However, savings 
over a certain amount is not allowed and the claimants’ partner must not work more than 24 
hours per week. Furthermore, the income for the entire household is taken into account when 
assessing whether the claimant as eligible for the benefit. The benefit duration is not limited in 
time.  
It is also worth mentioning that there exist a large number of different benefits in the UK besides 
the two types of Jobseekers Allowance (for instance Employment and Support Allowance, Carer’s 
Allowance and Income Support). Income-based Jobseekers Allowance and a number of the means-
tested benefits are currently being phased out and replaced with a new type of benefit called 
Universal Credit. Furthermore, there exist supplementary benefits such as Child Benefit, Working 
Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefits and so on and many citizens receive different kinds 
of benefits at the same time – and also while being in employment (Deloitte and CARMA, 2015: 
61).  
Supplementary insurance 
In the UK, there also exists a market for supplementary unemployment insurance because of the 
limited coverage in the statutory unemployment insurance system which is appealing to person 
with medium and high income levels (Unemployment Insurance Commission 2015a: 57). The most 
common type of supplementary insurance is so called ‘Mortgage Payment Protection Insurances’ 
which is insurance to cover mortgage expenses for home owners. This type of insurance is 
provided by banks, mortgage credit institutions and insurance companies. In 2007 8 pct. of the 
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working population had such insurance. Data from 2008 an onwards does not exist, but it is 
estimated that these insurances are declining (Unemployment Insurance Commission 2015a: 57-
58).  
4.4 Southern European Regimes (Spain)4 
The Southern European Regimes (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) are characterized by the fact 
that civil society plays an important role in providing social security. Especially the close family is 
expected to provide a wide range of welfare services for the individual such as child – and elder 
care (Esping-Andersen 1996). When it comes to unemployment benefits the Southern European 
Regimes are known for a rather fragmented coverage of the benefits were workers with a long 
seniority are better insured compared to younger workers with short or no seniority.    
 
Legal framework 
The legal framework regulating the unemployment benefit system is found in the General Social 
Security Act based at the Spanish Ministry of Employment. 
Organization and financing 
In Spain contributions to different types of social security benefits within a persons’ life course are 
compulsory and all adult Spanish residents contribute to the social security system. Contributions 
are paid through work activities. Unemployed persons are covered by two successive benefits: A 
compulsory contributory unemployment insurance benefit for 4 to 24 months depending on 
contributions and then an assistance benefit for 6 to 30 months. There is also a last resort scheme 
called the Ingreso Minimo de Inserción (social assistance). Family benefits are income-related. The 
Spanish Public Employment Service (SEPE), an autonomous organization under the control of the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Security, is entrusted with the management and control of 
unemployment benefits in Spain. The system is financed through 1,55 pct. contribution by the 
employees and 5,5 pct. by the employers on the employees’ salaries up to 3262 Euros per month 
and smaller state contributions. Only employees are allowed into the scheme. Self-employed 
persons have to make private arrangement for unemployment insurance.  
  
                                                     
4






Content of the insurance 
In order to be entitled to the contributory unemployment benefit in Spain, the following criteria 
must be met: 
 registered with the Spanish Social Security Service; 
 legally unemployed, registered as a job seeker in the public employment service, actively 
seeking employment and are willing to accept suitable employment; 
 have paid contributions for at least 360 days in the 6 years before becoming unemployed 
or before the end of the obligation to pay contributions; 
 older than 16 and have not yet reached retirement age 
Unemployment benefits are based on the most recent salary from the previous 6 months with a 
minimum and maximum level. The average daily salary is multiplied by 30 in order to reach a 
monthly base and the monthly benefit is 70 pct. of that base. After 6 months of unemployment, 
the benefit level is 50 pct. of base earnings for the remaining period of the benefits. A supplement 
is possible in case of the claimant having dependent children. Benefit duration is dependent upon 
the contribution length. For instance, if a person has contributed from 360 days to 539 days the 
benefit duration is 120 days (4 months). If a person has contributed over 2160 days (6 years), 
benefit duration is 720 days (2 years).  
Other benefits 
If persons haven’t paid enough social security contributions or fall into a specific category, it’s 
possible to receive other non-contributory unemployment benefits. Non-contributory 
unemployment allowance can be applied for if a person is not entitled to contributory 
unemployment benefits because the person have not paid the social security contributions 
required, or because the person has exhausted contributory benefits but are still unemployed. 
Active integration income is an option in case of long-term unemployment for 45 to 65 year olds. 
Emigrant workers returning from abroad who are older than 45, people with disabilities and 




5.0 Comparison and discussion  
In the past section 4 we described four different unemployment insurance systems in four 
different welfare state regimes and in this section we make a comparison and discuss pros and 
cons of each system. In table 2 a comparable overview of important features of the four 
unemployment insurance systems is presented, which the discussion will be centered around.  
Table 2 - Important features of unemployment insurance systems in Denmark, Germany, UK and Spain 
 Social Democratic Continental  Liberal Southern European 
 Denmark Germany UK Spain 
Type of system Voluntary Compulsory Compulsory Compulsory 
Legal framework 
(regulation) 





Book III in the 
German Social Code  
Jobseekers Act General Social 
Security Act 
Responsible unit  at 
the political level 
Ministry of 
Employment 
Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social 
Affairs 
Department for 
























contributions paid by 
members of 
unemployment 
insurance funds + 
large state subsidy 
Equally contributions 
from employees and 
employers, state 
subsidy to run labour 
offices 
Equally contributions 









(approximately 80 %) 
+ state subsidy  
Target group Employees and self-







Employees.  Employees.  
Coverage rate 2010 
(the share of insured 




78 % 75 % 90 % 65 % 
Eligibility criteria 
(access criteria) 
Member of an 
unemployment 
insurance fund for at 
least on year and has 
reported at least 
30,003 Euro as full-
time insured or 
12 months of 
contribution to the 
insurance scheme 
within 2 years 
Paid contributions 
for at least 26 weeks 
within one of the 
two previous tax 
years and minimum 
50 times (weeks) in 
the last 2 years 
Paid contribution 
360 days out of the 
previous 6 years 
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20,022 Euro as full-
time insured during a 
period of three years 
together) 
Benefit level Calculated on basis 
of the 12 months 
within the last 24 
years with the 
highest income. 
Maximum 90 % of 
previous earnings, 
but ceiling of 
maximum 2473 
Euros per month 
exist (full-time 
insured). Lower 
levels for graduates 
(max 71.5 % of 
previous earnings).    
Dependent upon age 
and children. 60-67 
% of prior income, 
but monthly 
maximum limit.  
Dependent upon 
age. 18-24 year olds: 
65 Euro per week. 
25+ years: 82 Euro 
per week.  
70 % of average 
wage for max 6 
months. Then 50 % 
for the rest of the 
period.  
Benefit duration Maximum 2 years 
within a period of 3 
years 
1 year for persons 
under 50. Up to 2 
years for persons 
over 50.  
182 days (6 months) Depends on the 
contribution period 
4-24 months 
Waiting period No No 7 days No 
Quarantine 3 weeks 12 weeks 26 weeks NA 
 
First of all, Denmark stands out with a voluntarily unemployment insurance system compared to 
compulsory systems in Germany, UK and Spain. As mentioned in section 3, the literature argues 
that problems with adverse selection will not occur in compulsory systems, because here the 
insurance cannot be deselected. Therefore, the share of persons enrolled in a compulsory 
insurance will be higher than in a voluntarily system and compulsory systems will include larger 
groups at the labour market. However, a voluntarily system can actually have a high support level 
from the employed population, which is the case for Denmark, where almost 80 % of the working 
population have chosen membership of an unemployment insurance fund (Høgedahl & Kongshøj, 
2017). However, it is true that certain groups at the Danish labour market have deselected the 
scheme, wherefore some sort of selection is taking place in Denmark (see previous explanations in 
the description of the Danish unemployment insurance system). On the other hand, a compulsory 
system is not a guarantee for a high support to the unemployment scheme. In the Spanish case 
only around 65 % of the workforce are insured against unemployment. This is due to the 
insider/outsider problem that occurs due to strict eligibility criteria.  
Despite differences in the type of system (compulsory of voluntary), the unemployment insurance 
systems in all four countries are embedded in legislative frameworks, where certain laws regulates 
the unemployment insurance. This legislation contains among other things the rules that apply for 
entering the insurance and staying within the insurance scheme. The legislations are passed in the 
national parliaments and in all four countries the overall responsible unit for the insurance is the 
national Employment Ministries.  
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In all four countries certain organizations or agencies are responsible for the administration and 
disbursement of the insurance at the operational level and their tasks are, amongst other things, to 
calculate and disburse the benefits, assess whether the claimants live up to the criteria for 
entering and staying in the scheme and sanction unemployed if they do not live up to the criteria. 
In the compulsory systems in Germany, UK and Spain government labour agencies administer the 
scheme, but in the voluntarily system in Denmark, independent unemployment insurance funds 
administer the scheme. However, they are supervised by a government agency that ensures that 
the independent funds administer the scheme as it is intended. An ongoing debate and critique 
towards the independent funds in Denmark is that, because they are affiliated with the trade 
unions, they are not capable of neutral judgements and assessments but their assessments will 
always be in favor of the unemployed members. This critique is often put forward by the employer 
side. The funds themselves disagree.  
So Denmark stands out from the rest of the countries, because trade unions are involved in the 
unemployment insurance scheme. As described in the previous section about Denmark, the funds 
are independent organizations, but for historical reasons most of them have a close connection to 
trade unions (originally trade unions established unemployment insurance funds and this setup 
was carried on, when the state become involved in the insurance). As mentioned, opponents of 
trade union influence argue that the funds are not capable of making neutral judgements because 
of their trade union affiliation which is contested by the funds themselves. On the other hand, 
countries with systems like the Danish Ghent-system have higher union densities, wherefore 
Ghent-systems can be an advantage for labour movements as a recruitment mechanism (for more 
on the connection between trade unions and unemployment insurance funds please see 
Høgedahl, 2014 and Høgedahl & Kongshøj, 2017).   
The countries also differ in terms of financing. In Denmark, the unemployment insurance is 
financed through contributions from the employed population through membership fee in the 
unemployment insurance funds and subsidies from the state. In Germany, UK and Spain the 
insurance is financed through employee - and employer contributions and with some degree of 
state subsidy as well. In Germany and the UK, employees and employers contribute equally. In 
Spain employers contribute more than employees. Denmark is the country where the state 
subsidizes the most. As mentioned in the previous description of Denmark, members of the funds 
pay a fixed fee to the state to finance the insurance which is at a quite modest level (34 Euros per 
month). This means that the state defrays the rest of the expenses and in times with higher 
unemployment levels, the state has more expenses to the insurance. An insurance scheme like the 
Danish therefore gives the state a high degree of economic responsibility for sustaining the 
insurance, which is not the case in the three other countries.  
On the other hand, the Danish system is able to keep member contributions at a relatively low 
level, which means that it is attractive to all income groups at the labor market including low-wage 
groups. This is probably why the scheme has a high public support with the majority of the 
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working population being members of unemployment insurance funds. Furthermore, certain 
redistribution takes place, where members pay the same fee and receives the same benefit level 
regardless of their risk of unemployment. This make the Danish system more solidary and 
collectivistic. The advantage with a system like the Danish unemployment insurance system with a 
high degree of state financing is the creation of a more robust system that can function across 
different economic states. Furthermore, when the contribution fee is fixed, it remains attractive 
for a large part of the working population and thus diminishes adverse selection (Unemployment 
Insurance Commission 2015d: 5). However, there are also arguments against a high level of state 
financing and a fixed member fee. For instance, it can give rise to the more unstable employment 
types because the individual contribution to the insurance is the same regardless of type of job 
(Bjørn and Høy 2014:9).   
In Spain, where employers are obligated to contribute more to the insurance than the employees, 
employers are reluctant to hire persons on permanent contracts because they then have more 
expenses to the insurance. Therefore they resort to employ on short, temporary contracts which 
already are quite widespread and more easy to use in Spain. However, this widespread use of 
temporary and flexible contracts with a low degree of employment protection has created 
problems with a dual labour market, where persons in permanent contracts have a high degree of 
security while the temporary workers have a hard time entering into the permanent and secure 
contracts and it seems as if the mandatory employer contribution to the unemployment insurance 
scheme play a part in this matter.     
In terms of target groups, there also are some differences. In the compulsory systems in Germany, 
UK and Spain the main target group is employees, while the Danish voluntarily system also 
includes self-employed. In Germany, self-employed can be allowed into the scheme on a 
voluntarily basis under certain conditions. Self-employed are one of the groups often categorized 
as atypical and as a flexible type of labour and most often self-employed does not enjoy the same 
rights and the same protection as employees in subordinate relationships. Therefore it is worth 
considering whether such atypical groups should be allowed into the scheme in order to provide 
them with more security. However, since their conditions differ from employees it may be more 
complex to include these groups in an unemployment insurance system. For instance, in Denmark 
self-employed were allowed into the scheme at a rather late point in time and there have been 
challenges calculation benefits, previous earnings and assessing whether the self-employed live up 
to the eligibility criteria.  
In all four countries, there are a number of access criteria in order to have access to the 
unemployment scheme and normally it requires some sort of prior labour market attachment. In 
the compulsory systems the requirement is that the person must have paid contributions to the 
insurance for a certain amount of time and contributions are only paid while being employed. 
Furthermore, in the UK the contributions are also dependent upon the persons wage level, where 
low contributions are not paid if the income is below a certain level. In Denmark the requirements 
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are membership of an unemployment insurance fund for at least one year and documentation of a 
certain amount of income from work during the previous three years. Graduates can be 
unemployment members for free and receive unemployment insurance after graduation. In all 
four countries, it seems is if the requirements for entering the scheme is quite similar (around 1 
year of employment), but the access criteria means that certain low income groups and persons in 
non-standard and flexible positions may find it difficult to become eligible for the insurance, 
because they simple have not contributed enough.   
The countries are also similar in terms of access to unemployment benefits. Access is only allowed 
if job loss is not self-induced and the person claiming the benefit must be available for work and 
actively seeking work. In Germany and the UK, persons working few hours per week are allowed 
into the scheme (less than 15 hours per week in Germany and less than 16 hours per week in the 
UK), while Denmark and Spain stipulates that persons must be totally outside employment.  
In terms of the generosity of the unemployment insurance (benefit level and benefit duration), the 
countries differ quite a lot. Despite of the recent reforms of the unemployment insurance system 
(see earlier description) Denmark still seems to have the highest generosity levels in terms of the 
longest benefit period and the highest compensation rate. Spain and Germany have fairly high 
compensation levels but the level in the UK is quite low in a comparative perspective. The benefit 
duration is also the shortest in the UK, making the UK the least generous system of the four. 
Quarantine in case of self-induced job loss and the length of a waiting period before receiving 
benefits are also strictest in the UK.  
In all four countries, there also are some groups that have better possibilities in the system 
compared to others. For instance, in Germany and the UK, benefit levels are dependent upon age, 
where younger claimants receive a lower benefit level. This is also the case in Denmark, where 
graduates can receive a maximum of 71.5 pct. of prior income. In Germany older workers are also 
entitled to longer benefit durations.  
A profound principle for unemployment insurance systems is that there ought to be certain 
criteria in order to gain access to the scheme and certain requirements in order to stay in the 
scheme and remain eligible for the unemployment insurance. This has to do with the perception 
that unemployment insurance is a temporarily arrangement in the case of job loss. Therefore, 
requirements and incentives are inherent parts of the systems. However, how strict or loose these 
requirements and incentives should be is also a question about different contextual issues in the 
different countries, political preferences and the view upon the nature of the unemployed and 
how they should find way back into employment. These issues can explain some of the differences 
between the four countries included in this report. However, it is also worth considering whether 
the systems are designed in such ways that it hinders a decent living standard while being 
temporarily unemployed. For instance, in the UK the benefit levels are at a quite low level 
(between 10 and 30 pct. of previous earnings). On the one hand it gives large incentives to quickly 
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return to employment but on the other hand there may be times where employment is more 
difficult to obtain (for instance in economic downturns), where the benefit level and the benefit 
duration seems quite low in the case of the UK.  
6.0 Conclusions and perspectives  
In this final section we discuss our findings in the previous sections and point out certain issues 
and perspectives which we find important when UCCT are considering the design of a potentially 
new unemployment system in Tunisia. 
First of all it is important to underline some of the basic problems of an unemployment insurance 
system. The issue of potential moral hazard needs to be taking into account. Here, the insured 
persons can affect own risk of unemployment as well as the length of the unemployment spell. 
Therefore, purely private insurance unemployment insurance systems are not desirable, which the 
international experiences in the field also indicate.   
Private insurance schemes are also based upon a so called actuarial principle. This means that the 
premium (the amount of money paid by the insured for the insurance) is dependent upon a 
weighted calculation on a persons’ risk of unemployment and size of income loss causing adverse 
selection as a consequence. This means that not all workers have the same incentive for being part 
of the unemployment system. However, the unemployment insurance systems in Denmark and 
the rest of Nordic Ghent-countries are based on a voluntary membership in private 
unemployment insurance funds. These funds are controlled by the labour movement and 
subsidized by the state. However, in order to develop a similar system in Tunisia, a strong and 
locally rooted labour movement is needed. This also includes a sufficient corporation between the 
unemployment insurance funds and the government (e.g. Ministry of Employment) securing a fair 
and effective administration of the system. Another path would be setting up a compulsory and 
state run system which is also the most common model. 
Another issue is financing the system. Here it is important to find some sort of arrangement 
between employers, employees and the state. One of the easiest ways of solving this issue is by 
implementing a fully taxed paid and state subsided system. However, this will require a sufficient 
tax system which includes both business - and income tax and may require a tax increase.  Another 
model could be a mixed model including contributions from both the employees, employers and 
the state as seen in many countries. However, as our analysis shows, this can lead to a dual labour 
market with insider/outsider problems since many employers are more inclined to employ 
workers on contracts that do not obligate them to pay contributions to an unemployment 
insurance fund if the employer contributions to the system are high. Another point to pay 
attention to is the level of the contribution made by the employees, where the contributions 
should be at a level that is payable for employees. Furthermore, when the state is involved in the 
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scheme, the level of state financing is also important. In the compulsory schemes described in this 
report, state financing play a minor role.  
Last but not least it is important to have clear rules in terms of eligibility criteria, benefits levels 
and duration etc. These issues are basically political priorities. However, if an unemployment 
insurance system must be able to provide security and a decent living, the benefits must have a 
certain level and durations. It is also worth considering whether an unemployment insurance 
system should be designed for all workers on the labour market and whether it should give 
preferential treatment to some groups with special needs or disadvantages. In a number of 
countries persons in non-standard and flexible work forms (for instance self-employed) are not 
allowed into the schemes even though it can be argued that they are in the most need of 
economic support and protection. Furthermore, in many countries, like in the Southern European 
regimes, workers with a long seniority are better protected against unemployment while younger 
workers are in a much more unfavorable position. However, youth unemployment in Tunisia is a 
challenge (The World Bank, 2017) so the design of a potential unemployment insurance system 
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